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Abstract: The increasingly widespread use of smartcards for a variety of sensitive applications, including digital
signatures, creates the need to ensure and possibly certify the secure interoperability of these devices. Standard
certification criteria, in particular the Common Criteria, define security requirements but do not sufficiently address
the problem of interoperability. Here we consider the interoperability problem which arises when various appli-
cations interact with different smartcards through a middleware. In such a situation it is possible that a smartcard
of type S receives commands that were supposed to be executed on a different smartcard of type S′. Such “ex-
ternal commands” can interleave with the commands that were supposed to be executed on S. We experimentally
demonstrate this problem with a Common Criteria certified digital signature process on a commercially available
smartcard. Importantly, in some of these cases the digital signature processes terminate without generating an error
message or warning to the user.
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1 Introduction
Smartcards (SC) are becoming increasingly popular
in many countries and are deployed, for example, as
credit cards, health cards and electronic identification
documents. With these devices users control highly
sensitive information and may perform security tasks
such as electronic authentication and digital signature.
As the importance and world-wide spread of SCs in-
creases, the interoperability of these devices becomes
more important along with their security in environ-
ments where SCs from different manufacturers and is-
suers are used at the same time.
The Common Criteria (CC) [1] and the CWA
14169 [2] standards are used to certify the correct be-
havior of a SC in a well defined environment, i.e. for
a specific target of evaluation (TOE). The TOE is pre-
cisely described and usually comprises a specific mi-
croprocessor, a specified firmware and specified mid-
dleware [1]; however, environments where different
SCs are used at the same time are usually different
from the TOE. In particular, a SC could be confronted
with commands from different processes, be it acci-
dentally, on purpose or during an attack. Trusted SC
interoperability, therefore, requires a careful analysis
of how SCs operate in such situations and the consid-
eration of these results in the design of interoperable
systems.
One goal of current research and development
efforts regarding SC interoperability is to create a
framework that enables the concurrent use of differ-
ent SCs. These efforts focus on diverse topics such
as standardization [3], [4], [5], architectures for SC
based authentication services [6], and open protocols
[7].
However, interoperability problems emerge al-
ready with the attempt to recognize what type of SC is
actually used. In practice, this is currently done by de-
tecting the presence of certain applications on the SC
[8]. Deducing the SC type from such information is, at
its best, an indirect method which might not uniquely
identify the SC type, and leave it prone to potential at-
tacks. If the SC type is incorrectly identified, ”external
commands” will be sent to the SC. Here, we define an
”external command” as an Application Protocol Data
Unit (APDU) sequence that does not correspond to the
regular APDU sequence supplied to the SC in the exe-
cutable code of the middleware originally used during
the security certification (e.g. according to CC). In a
setting where different SCs interact with applications
via a middleware, APDUs that are supposed to be de-
livered to a certain SC type S might be received by a
SC of type S′ (e.g., due to routing errors). In such sit-
uations “external commands” can interleave with reg-
ular commands.
References [9], [10] study the behavior of com-
mercial signature SCs during the sequential steps of
a digital signature process. First the APDUs sent -
in the setting used for the CC certification - from the
middleware to the SC were identified. Using a model
checking approach, the SCs were then targeted with
modified APDUs during the digital signature process
of a fixed document. The experiments showed that
certain modified commands are accepted by the SCs
without errors being generated and demonstrated that
CC certification is not sufficient to address the SC in-
teroperability problem.
In this work we address the problem of interleav-
ing commands for SC interoperability by analyzing
the situation in which different applications interact
with SCs via a middleware. A CC certified digital
signature process on a commercially available SC is
then tested to demonstrate the relevance of this prob-
lem experimentally. Finally, we discuss the complex-
ity of the underlying issues and how the experimental
test setup may be improved in the future to identify
and prevent potential interoperability problems of this
kind.
2 The Interoperability Problem: In-
terleaving Command Sequences
To address the interoperability problem on a funda-
mental level, we consider a straight-line program P1
with steps S1,1, S1,2, ...., S1,l. It is assumed that the
straight line program P1 has been certified to produce
a correct result if the sequence of commands C1,1,
C1,2, ..., C1,l originally associated with these steps is
executed in the correct order and without modifica-
tions on a SC of type S. For example, the command
sequence C1,1, C1,2, ..., C1,l could match the one sup-
plied to S in the executable code of the middleware
that was used for CC certification. We call a com-
mand Ci,j “globally legal” if it is processed in step
Si,j of program Pi on SC of type S and the process Pi
has been certified on S.
In an environment where several applications in-
teract with SCs via a middleware, commands from an-
other straight line program P2 may interleave with the
commands from P1 on S. Here P2 is a straight line
program for another SC type S′ with steps S2,1, S2,2,
...., S2,k and commands C2,1, C2,2, ..., C2,k. Fig. 1
illustrates the situation and shows how SC S receives
interleaving commands associated with different steps
of the two digital signature processes P1 and P2.
We will now analyze this SC interoperability
problem in more detail, and in particular we distin-
guish the following cases:
Signature Process
P1
Signature Process
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C1,1 C1,1
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Figure 1: Two concurrent signing sessions
1. In step S1,j of P1, SC S receives command C1,j
and processes it without error. The digital sig-
nature process makes a correct transition to step
S1,j+1.
2. In step S1,j of P1, SC S receives command C2,i
corresponding to step S2,i of P2 and correctly
generates an error. At this point the error can
be detected and digital signature process can be
interrupted.
3. In step S1,j of P1, SC S receives command C2,i
corresponding to step S2,i of P2 and processes
it without generating an error, i.e. the SC rec-
ognizes this command as “locally legal”. How-
ever, in this case, C2,i is not globally legal. We
refer to this situation as an “anomaly” since it is
unknown how the overall signature process will
be affected. The program may now potentially
make a transition to any step of the two programs
P1 or P2.
The first case simply describes the correct pro-
cess. In the second case, the digital signature process
may be interrupted, but the important point is that an
error is generated and this error can be detected by
the middleware. The interoperability environment can
then be designed to handle such situations appropri-
ately. The third possibility, however, poses the real
problem for trusted SC interoperability: the “certi-
fied” and, therefore, trusted process has been modi-
fied but no error message has been generated. One
anomaly can potentially be followed by several others
and finally the digital signature process may terminate
with a questionable result. Without receiving an error
or a warning, a user cannot know whether all steps in
the digital signature process were completed correctly
or whether there have been one or more anomalies.
In the following we demonstrate experimentally,
with a commercially available CC certified SC for
digital signature, how commands from a different
straight line program may interleave with the origi-
nal one. Furthermore we present one example where
even though an error is generated, an external com-
mand that intersects the original program can render a
SC inappropriate for further use. The testing environ-
ment developed for this purpose, as well as relevant
details about SCs are described in the next section.
3 The Testing Environment
In our experiments, we study two commercially avail-
able SCs from two different manufacturers. The core
of a SC is its microprocessor, which contains on
board, a cryptographic processor, a small EEPROM
random access memory (≈ 64 KBytes), an operating
system and a memory mapped file system [11]. The
microprocessor is customized (masked) in order to ex-
ecute APDU sent from external software applications
through a serial communication line.
The ISO 7816 standard [3], specifies the set of
APDU that can be implemented by any compatible
SC microprocessor. In particular, an APDU consists
of a mandatory header of 4 bytes: the Class Byte (cla),
the Instruction Byte (ins) and two parameter bytes (p1,
p2). The header can be followed by a conditional body
of variable length, which is composed by the length
(in bytes) of the data field (lc), the data field itself and
the maximum number of bytes expected in the data
field of the response (le). Responses to any APDU are
encoded in a variable length data field and two bytes
mandatory return codes.
To probe and analyze the SC behavior we have
developed a Crypto Probing System (CPS) whose
overall architecture is shown in fig. 2. As each SC
uses a different APDU sequence in the digital sig-
nature process, the CPS is designed to interface with
both SCs used in this project. Effectively, it therefore
acts as a middleware between the external applications
and the real SCs.
The CPS is able to translate its simplified instruc-
tions to the corresponding sequence of APDUs (cla,
ins, p1, p2, length and values of the possible annexed
data buffer) to be sent to the connected physical SC
and to translate the SC responses in a common for-
mat. Moreover, to further simplify the interface with
the SC, the CPS is given the globally legal APDUs
to be sent in each step of the digital signature process
(SC commands flow), and the CPS is able to generate
alternate command sequences to test the SC responses
TCP/IP Server
Console Interface
Command Parser
Command
Interpreter
General Smart
Card Interface
Library
Smart Card
Command Flow
Physical Card
Interface (Incrypto)
Physical Card
Interface (Infineon)
Perturbation
Probe
Figure 2: Architecture of the Crypto Probing System
in different situations. This way, the CPS offers a sim-
ple interface for testing applications verifying process
correctness and robustness on different physical de-
vices and in the presence of interleaving command se-
quences.
The CPS can be invoked via command line, to in-
teractively test the command sequences, or used as a
daemon, which stays in execution and accepts com-
mands on TCP/IP connections. The commands sent
via command line are parsed and interpreted by the
CPS based on SC library. The elementary instruction
of the CPS is made by a single APDU.
4 Results
In this section we present the main experimental re-
sults of this work. We use the CPS testing envi-
ronment to show how external commands interleave
with the globally legal commands in a SC based dig-
ital signature process. The experiments are carried
out with two CC certified SCs from STM-Incrypto34
and Infineon-CardOs [12], [13]. The main results are
shown in figs. 3, 4, and 5 and tables 1 and 2.
The left (right) column of fig. 3 presents the 10 (5)
steps of the digital signatures processes with the In-
crypto (Infineon) SCs. Note that we do not count the
initial ”RESET” and have given similar steps in both
processes the same label, although the APDUs asso-
ciated with these steps may be different.
Fig. 3 shows how the commands ”Get Challenge”
and ”Give Challenge” from steps (1, 5) and (1, 6)
from process P1 interleave with steps (2, 1) to (2, 5)
of process P2 on the Infineon SC (central column in
fig. 3). No error message is generated, and the pro-
cess P2 terminates as if no interference occurred. In
fact, our experiments show that “Get Challenge” and
“Give Challenge” commands of process P1 can inter-
leave with process P2 before and after all of its steps.
In this case, the interleaving commands of two glob-
ally legal digital signature processes create a result
whose trustworthiness has not been assured. Because
P1 P2
Infineon Card
1,0
RESET
1,1
MASTER FILE
1,2
CHANGE DIR
1,3
MSE RESTORE
1,4
MSE SET
1,5
GET CHALLENGE
1,6
GIVE CHALLENGE
1,7
VERIFY
1,8
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1,9
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Digital Signature)
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RESET
2,1
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2,2
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2,4
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2,0
RESET
2,1
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2,2
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2,3
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2,4
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(Compute 
Digital Signature)
Figure 3: Two concurrent signing sessions, Infineon
Smartcard
a user cannot distinguish this situation from one in
which no anomaly occurred, this problem might un-
dermine the overall trustworthiness of SC use in an
interoperable environment. Furthermore, sending the
“Get Challenge” and “Give Challenge” commands re-
peatedly to the SC could be used by an attacker to put
a digital signature process effectively on hold.
The results shown in fig. 4 were obtained with
the Incrypto SC. As above, P1 represents the digi-
tal signature process associated with this SC and the
globally legal APDUs of each step are given in ta-
ble 1 (here RN is short for “random number”). Pro-
cess P2 contains APDUs that are either slightly or
substantially different from the globally legal APDUs
in P1 (see table 2, the modified parts are printed in
bold font). In particular, certain APDUs are not doc-
umented for the Incrypto SC: these APDUs are there-
fore labeled as “undefined”. The exact sequence of
APDUs in P2 is not part of a single digital signature
process on any SC we are aware of. Nevertheless,
these commands could well be part of such processes
implemented on one or several different SCs.
P1 P2
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Figure 4: Two concurrent signing sessions, Incrypto
Smartcard
The command sequence executed in our experi-
ments is shown in the central column of fig. 4. Al-
though this executed process contains six additional
commands (five of them “undefined”) and four mod-
ified commands, it terminates without any error mes-
sage. In addition, the sequence can be looped back
to the first node (1,1) “Master File” after any step
of the executed process and afterwards continue until
the end. These examples show how drastically digi-
tal signature processes can be modified via interleav-
ing commands without the associated anomalies being
recognized. An interoperable environment that does
not address this issue may not be considered trustwor-
thy and may have vulnerabilities that potential attack-
ers could seek to exploit.
Table 1: Globally legal APDUs of process P1 in fig. 4
(hexadecimal representation)
Node Globally legal APDUs
cla ins p1 p2 Lc Data Le
1,1 00 A4 00 00 00 - FF
1,2 00 A4 00 00 02 14 00 FF
1,3 00 22 F3 03 00 - 00
1,4 00 22 F1 B6 03 83 01 10 00
1,5 00 84 00 00 00 - 08
1,6 80 86 00 00 08 RN 00
1,7 0C 20 00 9A 08 PIN 00
1,8 00 84 00 00 00 - 08
1,9 80 86 00 00 08 RN 00
1,10 0C 2A 9E 9A 75 00-74 FF
Table 2: Globally legal and modified APDUs of the
executed process of fig. 4 (hexadecimal representa-
tion)
Node Globally legal and modified APDUs
cla ins p1 p2 Lc Data Le
1,1 00 A4 00 00 00 - FF
2,k 81 86 00 00 02 14 00 00
2,k+1 8F 86 00 00 02 14 00 00
2,k+2 80 86 AC 45 08 RN 00
1,2 00 A4 00 00 02 14 00 FF
2,l 81 86 00 00 02 14 00 00
1,3 00 22 F3 03 00 - 00
1,4 00 22 F1 B6 03 83 01 10 00
2,m 00 84 BD 17 00 - 08
2,m+1 80 86 AC 45 08 RN 00
1,7 0C 20 00 9A 08 PIN 00
2,n 8C 86 00 00 02 14 00 00
2,n+1 00 84 BD 17 00 - 08
2,n+2 80 86 AC 45 08 RN 00
1,10 0C 2A 9E 9A 75 00-74 FF
2,p 8C 86 00 00 02 14 00 00
Finally, we would like to point out a problem
caused by interleaving commands that has consider-
able consequences even though an error is generated.
In this experiment (shown in fig. 5), P2 contains the
“MSE Erase” command. This command is usually not
part of a digital signature process as it erases the Se-
curity Environment Object (SEO); however, it is con-
ceivable that this command is used by an application
interacting with the middleware for some purpose. It
may then accidentally, or even in an attack, interleave
with a digital signature process like P1. We observe
experimentally that “MSE Erase”, executed as shown
in the central column of fig. 5, erases the SEO on the
SC without warning, and the digital signature process
generates an error after the next step S1,3. The digital
signature function of the SC is herewith permanently
destroyed and a physical replacement of the SC is re-
quired. In principal, such vulnerability could be sys-
P1 P2
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RESET
1,2
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1,3
MSE RESTORE
1,4
MSE SET
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RESET
1,3
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Figure 5: Signing session with interleaving “MSE
Erase” command
tematically exploited in an attack on all SCs issued by
the digital signature service provider because neither
PIN nor PUK is required to execute the “MSE Erase”
command.
5 Conclusion
The experiments described above show that the prob-
lem of interleaving command sequences is serious and
that it must be addressed to ensure a secure and trust-
worthy environment for SC interoperability.
As stated in the introduction, in previous work
[9], [10] a C-Murphi model checker [14] has been
used to test SC behavior in the presence of disturbed
commands. Model checking can address extended
systems which can assume millions of different states
[15] and can in principal be used to identify anoma-
lies. However, the complexity of the verification in-
creases exponentially if interleaving commands are to
be taken into account: assume that for every step of
two digital signature processes, the input command
has only a 16 bits and assume that the two signa-
ture processes consist of 10 steps each. Even under
this strong simplification, a brute force model checker
may be required to make more than
(
20
10
)
∗216+16 tests.
This is due to the fact that in this approach all pos-
sible sequences that can be obtained by mixing the
two signature processes are generated. Note that in an
interoperable environment, possibly tens, if not hun-
dreds, of applications may interact concurrently with
various SC types via some middleware. As a result,
a brute force model checking approach is clearly not
a viable solution, especially if it is operated on real
SCs as illustrated in the experiments described above
where the execution of a single command can take up
to 1 second.
In future research, we plan to extend the model
checking approach to avoid brute force testing and to
identify errors and anomalies effectively. This can be
done if one prevents the model checker from search-
ing through all possible sequences of anomalies and
errors by taking the results of the already existing CC
certification into account. Such an efficient model
checker can then be integrated into a middleware as
a “watch-dog” to identify an anomaly as it occurs
and to prevent computational chains with two or more
anomalies. In this case, it will be possible to extend
the CC to certify the anomaly-free interoperability of
several SC applications interacting via a middleware
with different SC types.
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